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Abstract 
 
The principal effects of Brexit on health and health care will fall within the United 
Kingdom. Far from the promised extra funding for the NHS, any form of Brexit will 
have overwhelmingly negative implications for health care and health within the UK 
(Fahy et al 2017, 2019; Hervey and Speakman 2018).  
 
This article focuses on the external effects of Brexit for health and health care, or its 
Brexternalities (Armstrong 2019a 2019b). The EU is a particularly powerful 
institutional and legal arrangement for managing economic and political externalities 
(Weatherill 2016). This is the case for health policy as much as for any other policy 
area in which the EU is involved. Equally, when a state leaves the EU, the manner of 
leaving will result in better or worse management of relevant externalities.  Notions 
such as state sovereignty, or taking (back) control, which have dominated UK 
discussions about Brexit, in and of themselves discount externalities. 
 
A health Brexternality has the following features: the effects of leaving the EU impose 
costs or benefits on the health of others who are involved in neither the decision to 
leave the EU, nor decisions about the manner in which the UK leaves the EU. 
Brexternalities thus involve questions about policy legitimacy and accountability.  In 
the health domain, Brexternalities fall mainly in EU countries, although some are felt 
by certain groups within the UK. Health Brexternalities do not fall equally in all EU 
countries. They are felt more distinctly in the context of those elements of health policy 
that are most closely entwined with the UKs health policy: for instance, on the island 
of Ireland; certain areas of Spain and other parts of southern Europe. Some health 
Brexternalities, such as in medicines safety, will be imposed on the whole population 
of the EU. And some health Brexternalities, such as communicable disease control, 
will be felt globally.   
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Introduction 
 
The principal effects of Brexit on health and health care will fall within the United 
Kingdom. Far from the promised extra funding for the NHS, any form of Brexit will 
have overwhelmingly negative implications for health care and health within the UK 
(Fahy et al 2017, 2019; Hervey and Speakman 2018). But what about the external 
effects of Brexit for health and health care, or its Brexternalities (Armstrong 2019a 
2019b; Greer and Laible 2019)?  
 
The EU is a particularly powerful institutional and legal arrangement for managing 
economic and political externalities (Weatherill 2016). Of course, such arrangements 
are incomplete, but compared to other trade agreements or international institutional 
infrastructures, the EUs decision-making processes, including their reviewability by 
national and EU courts, do a relatively good job of including within policy decisions 
those entities and people who will be affected by such decisions. Not every outsider is 
so included, but the EU manages inclusion through a range of legitimacy and 
accountability processes (Schmidt and Wood, 2019), all of which are legally mandated, 
in that the EU is itself a creature of law, and operates on a substantively and 
procedurally constitutionalised basis, constrained by legal competences. 
 
This legally-mandated and -secured inclusion of those who would otherwise be 
outsiders is in place for health policy as much as for any other policy area in which 
the EU is involved. To give a flavour: EU health legislation is adopted according to 
processes that include the directly elected European Parliament. Parliament has been 
quite effective in the health policy domain at securing legislative change  in recent 
years, for instance, in medical devices regulation, data protection, clinical trials 
regulation, and patients rights. Sometimes the Parliament has relied on its locus 
before the CJEU to challenge legislation in the health policy domain that is outside the 
scope of the EUs competences  for instance, in protection of intellectual property 
rights in substances of human origin used, among other contexts, in biomedical 
research (Hervey and McHale 2004: 260-270). Administrative acts of the EU 
institutions are also subject to judicial review, either before national courts (if national 
institutions have sufficient discretion in implementing those decisions), or before the 
European courts (in particular the General Court). Economic actors, and human 
beings with appropriate standing, can also seek judicial review of EU health law and 
policy  as for instance the case in tobacco regulation (Hervey and McHale 2004: 96-
105; Hervey and McHale 2015: 390-394), or privacy rights to health information 
(Hervey and McHale 2015: 173-176). And where EU law is relied upon to open up 
markets in ways which might be deleterious to health, the CJEU can hear references 
from national courts charged with determining whether the relevant balance of 
interests is appropriate. A great deal of internal market litigation on free movement of 
products involves arguments about proportionate public health protection measures. 
The balance between opening up opportunities to work or provide services in other 
Member States, through legally-mandated mutual recognition of professional medical 
qualifications, and securing patient safety and sustainability of domestic health 
systems, is also subject to oversight by courts. And so on.  
 
Equally, therefore, when a state leaves the EU, the manner of leaving will result in 
better or worse management of relevant externalities.  Notions such as state 
sovereignty, or taking (back) control, which have dominated UK discussions about 
Brexit, in and of themselves discount externalities. They assume closure of the space 
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within which political decisions are made (at the level of the UK), and the economic, 
social or other effects those decisions might have. They leave out accountability to 
those who are affected, whether within the state concerned (for instance, the question 
of where EU-held powers are repatriated (McHale et al 2020), or beyond it.  Decisions 
are subject neither to input, output, nor through-put legitimacy (Schmidt 2013; 
Schmidt and Wood, 2019) in terms of their external effects: the sovereignty of the 
nation state (the UK) is here a cipher for appropriate decision-making. 
 
Brexternalities thus involve questions about policy legitimacy and accountability. For 
(some) supporters of Brexit, EU membership by definition dilutes legitimacy and 
accountability, so leaving the EU can only improve it. But if we accept that legitimacy 
and accountability go beyond the electorate of the state whose government takes acts 
of state sovereignty  and being a Member State of the EU by definition entails 
accepting that  then we logically also should accept that the consequences of leaving 
the EU cannot be legitimized internally alone, and at least some outsiders should be 
included in legitimate decisions about whether  and crucially how  to leave the EU. 
It follows that some forms of Brexit  particularly those which involve on-going legal 
entitlements, and legally mandated institutional structures for dispute resolution  
will secure better inclusion of those excluded from the decision to leave the EU than 
others.  
 
This article explores the ideas articulated above through the principal Brexternalities 
in the health policy domain. It characterizes those health Brexternalities on the basis 
of their spatial extent: those affecting sub-sets of the EU; those affecting the EU as a 
whole; and those having a global effect. On the basis of the notion of legitimacy 
articulated above, it argues that better Brexits are those which at least attempt to 
secure some protection for outsiders who suffer detriment from a decision made by 
the insider population of the UK who were entitled to vote in the referendum, and 
from the acts of the insider UK governments that followed. As will be seen, the 
concepts of insider and outsider, critical to the definition of an externality are 
problematic in the context of Brexit as it has unfolded.  The article proceeds as follows: 
after a short methods section, the article explores the concept of Brexternalities, 
seeking to problematize the notions of insider and outsider using a temporal frame. 
Focusing on health, it tracks how we might conceptualise insiders and outsiders at 
different moments in the Brexit processes. The article then turns to the spatial. It 
outlines three types of health Brexternality: those affecting part of the EU; the EU as 
a whole; and with global effect. As almost none of our data points to any benefits, the 
article focuses mainly on the costs of Brexternalities.  
 
Methods  
 
This article draws on data from two separate projects, led by McHale and Hervey 
respectively. Hervey and Flear are involved in both projects; McHale, Speakman, 
Wood and Antova are involved in one of the two. Both involve desk-based research on 
health law and policy post-Brexit, drawing on a wide range of legal texts, policy 
documents, Parliamentary records, media reporting and literature. Our analysis of 
that data sought to determine the likely consequences of Brexit in various health 
domains: patients, health professionals, health-related products and services, and 
public health.  
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That data is supplemented as follows.  McHales project involved closed stakeholder 
consultation workshops held in Belfast, Brussels, Cardiff and Edinburgh, between 
October 2017 and January 2018), bringing together around 35 experts from different 
health policy contexts. McHale and Speakman collected data through 37 semi-
structured interviews1 conducted by telephone between November 2018 and February 
2019. Herveys project included 11 in-person semi-structured interviews carried out by 
Flear, Hervey and Wood between February and May 2019. In both projects, 
interviewees were identified from the workshops, government and health websites, 
published literature and recommendations. They represent a wide range of 
organizations in the health sector across the key areas of the UK health system broadly 
defined (patients, professionals, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, health 
research, and public health). Some interviewees are based outside the UK, or work 
within pan-EU health structures. Interviews focused on the effects of Brexit from the 
point of view of the interviewees particular health policy expertise. Because of the 
political sensitivity of the information, in the context of on-going Brexit negotiations, 
we have maintained the anonymity of interviewees and their organizations. Interviews 
ranged from 30 minutes to over 2 hours in length, with most taking around an hour. 
 
Health Brexternalities through time 
 
In economics (OECD 1993), an externality is a situation where the effect of 
production or consumption of goods and services imposes costs or benefits on others 
which are not reflected in the prices charged for those goods or services. Economic 
externalities are particular prevalent in health and health care (Mankiw 2017), where, 
for instance, especially if health care is privatized, the benefits of herd immunity are 
enjoyed by those beyond the group who bear the costs of individual acts deciding to be 
vaccinated; and the benefits of health research are felt by those outside the group of 
those funding it.  
 
By extension into politics, a political externality occurs when actions attributable to a 
group of people determine policy or law (or both) that applies to and imposes costs or 
benefits on individuals outside of that group. An externality is more pernicious than 
a mere repercussion because of its excluding effects, which de-legitimate the decision 
made, in the context of a democracy where decisions are supposed to involve those 
affected through political processes, and interests are supposed to be protected by legal 
means of accountability. Members of the insider group determine the political and 
regulatory environment within which outsiders must operate, without any (direct) 
way for the outsiders to be involved in the decision-making, or to negotiate the terms 
on which the decision is taken. Furthermore, outsiders have no means by which to 
hold the decision-makers legally or politically accountable for the effects of the 
decision. 
 
In order to understand externalities, and their relationship with legitimacy and 
accountability, therefore, we need to understand who are insiders and who outsiders 
when a particular decision or set of decisions is/are made with external effects. And 
we also need to have a conceptualization of what counts as inclusion in a decision: 
                                               
1 Research ethics approval was granted by the University of Birmingham, for McHales project, in 
advance of the telephone interviews, and by the University of Sheffield, for Herveys project, in advance 
of the in-person interviews. Before each interview, informants were provided with an interview protocol 
and required to sign a consent form.  Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and further consent was 
obtained for the use of quotations.   
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representation, voice, output, input, though-put/process, consideration of relevant 
interests, accountability for results, and so on? Finally, we might want to pay attention 
to the ways in which law structures inclusion  in this regard, socio-legal discourses 
suggest an inclusive aspiration, which is difficult both logistically and normatively: 
especially at a moment where state sovereignty is expressed unilaterally, such as 
Brexit.  In all these, attention to the temporal is essential (Armstrong 2017). 
 
Any state policy that has extra-territorial effects in principle involves externalities, as 
the electorate of other states cannot participate in the policy decision.  International 
organizations like the EU seek to manage externalities (Weatherill 2016). The EU 
manages externalities in part by using law in at least three ways. Law determines 
processes by which the external effects of state decisions are managed within the EUs 
internal market. Legal processes seek to include the whole affected population (within 
the EU) in electing representative institutions which are part of the EUs decision-
making process (although of course affected populations outside the EU are excluded).  
The EU gives outsiders access to judicial oversight of legal and policy decisions. In 
none of these is the EU complete in its inclusion of those excluded, but the EU achieves 
greater inclusion than mechanisms of ordinary international (trade) law. 
 
At the moment when the Cameron government called the EU referendum, the 
European Union Referendum Act 2015 determined the insiders (and, by definition, 
the outsiders) for the recommendation to the UK government as to whether the UK 
should leave or remain in the EU. The eligibility to vote in the EU referendum was 
determined by reference to the UKs general election franchise, framed by domestic 
(constitutional) law. This involved the exclusion of several groups which have come to 
be seen as particularly affected by Brexit: 16 and 17 year olds; UK-resident EU citizens 
except Irish citizens; and UK citizens resident abroad. 16 and 17 year olds had been 
eligible to vote in the earlier Scottish independence referendum.  UK-resident EU 
citizens are particularly affected by the loss of rights derived from EU citizenship, 
which include ability to work within the NHS, and to have medical qualifications from 
other Member States recognized in the UK; as well as access to healthcare, along with 
other social benefits, on the same basis as resident UK nationals. 
 
In the case of UK citizens resident abroad, attempts to use legal means to challenge 
exclusion were unsuccessful (Shindler and Maclennan [2016] EWHC 957; see 
Armstrong 2017).  This legally-blessed configuration of insiders was in effect 
continued in the Miller ruling ([2017] UKSC 5) of the UK Supreme Court, to the effect 
that the decision to trigger Article 50 TEU could not be taken by the government alone, 
but required an Act of Parliament (the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) 
Act 2017).  The question here concerned the legal category of the UKs own 
constitutional requirements, as mandated by Article 50 TEU: in other words, the legal 
frame is a combination of domestic and EU law. 
 
But after the triggering of Article 50 TEU, the way the decision-makers were 
understood changed to an international law/intergovernmental relations frame.  This 
move was critical to any arguments about the position of outsiders. The UK as the 
departing Member State was the key decision-maker on one side of a negotiation; and 
the Council of the EU-27 was the key decision-maker on the other side.  Neither 
negotiating position was the subject of legal challenge.  The Council-27s negotiating 
mandate (European Council 2017) authorized the Barnier negotiating team to 
negotiate on behalf of the EU-27.  Several aspects of it could have been legally 
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challenged, such as the way in which Council-27 interpreted Article 50 TEU as 
mandating a particular phasing of negotiations (Withdrawal Agreement before Future 
Relationship), or Council-27s particular interpretation of the EUs internal market (its 
indivisibility), leading, for instance, to the Barnier (2017) steps of doom position.   
 
UK domestic constitutional law precludes such a challenge.  But we can infer from the 
Wightman ruling (Case C-621/18) that the decision to withdraw from the EU was a 
unilateral act of the UK state, acting in an intergovernmental frame as the sovereign 
government representing the UK population.  The reality was, of course, that decisions 
taken by UK governments as part of the negotiating process could not be said to be 
legitimated by the whole of the UK population (given the EU referendum franchise 
and the closeness of the Leave vote); nor could anything about the way in which the 
UK sought to leave the EU be said to be legitimated by the referendum result, given 
that the question asked the electorate nothing about how, only whether or not to leave, 
and neither the 2017 nor the 2019 General Elections offered voters a clear perspective 
on what type of Brexit each political party would seek to deliver if in power.  The UKs 
negotiating positions for the Withdrawal Agreement and future EU-UK 
relationship(s), the executive agreement of the Withdrawal Agreement, even the 
European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020: all are acts which are not subject 
to any/much legitimating control involving any outsiders, and certainly none by 
judicial review. 
 
At the point of the referendum, Remain voters and Leave voters (and those who 
abstained) were all insiders in the sense that they had the opportunity to vote in the 
referendum. But unlike the ordinary political process in the UK, where those whose 
political party (and preferred policies) are on the losing side have another opportunity 
to influence decisions at the next general election, the EU referendum was constructed 
in UK political and constitutional narratives of the main political parties as a one-off 
vote.  This could be seen as imposing externalities not only on those who are now in 
the electorate and who will be affected by said one-off decision (for instance, those 
who, in June 2016, were aged 14-17, or were yet to secure UK citizenship) (some of 
whom may have voted Leave), but also on those who did and/or would now, vote 
Remain. 
 
The Millar ruling confirmed that the devolved governments are also outsiders, in that 
they have no legal entitlement to resist Brexit within their territories. At least arguably, 
they ought to be included, given the ways in which the UKs constitutional settlement 
has evolved over the last few decades (Fabbrini 2017). The First Minister of Scotland, 
Nicola Sturgeons moves indicating a possible future Scottish independent and 
seeking EU Membership referendum could be constructed as a legitimate and 
potentially legitimating attempt to reassert the powers of insiders for the Scottish 
population, who voted to Remain. 
 
Not one of our interviewees from outside the UK, and very few from within (for 
examples, see McHale et al 2018, McHale et al 2020), saw anything other than very 
minor health benefits from Brexit, and the vast majority of our data regards Brexit as 
fundamentally detrimental to health and the NHS. Indeed, the majority of 
interviewees focused on how EU-UK relations in health policy fields could be 
structured so as to secure as much continuity as possible with the status quo. Health 
experts (among experts in general) can be constructed as outsiders in the referendum 
process (which excludes any special claims to expertise, giving only one person one 
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vote), and in processes that unfolded after the referendum about the form that Brexit 
would take. Political narratives about the referendum result  for instance to the effect 
that this country has had enough of experts (Mance 2016)  excluded from policy 
decisions stakeholders who would normally have been included on account of their 
policy expertise. For instance, the UK governments decision to authorize the Secretary 
of State for Health to permit the substitutability of medicines by pharmacists, without 
reference to the prescribing medical professional, in the event of medicines shortages 
following a No-Deal Brexit, excluded many stakeholders, such as patients groups and 
medical professional organizations, whom some of our interviewees told us would 
normally have been included in such a policy process.  Rather, the will of the people 
as understood as expressed in the referendum vote, displaces inclusion of expertise.  
That exclusion did not, however, found a basis for judicial review (The Good Law 
Project 2019). 
 
Moreover, as time passed, the position of the UK Parliament vis-à-vis its government 
became more and more difficult to square with any notion of accountability or 
legitimacy through ordinary processes of parliamentary representative democracy.  
The way in which both main parties (Conservatives and Labour) were split between 
Leave and Remain de facto precluded effective parliamentary opposition, which is 
crucial in the UK constitution to secure the inclusion of those voters whose preferences 
are not reflected in any particular government. Indeed, various moves by the House of 
Commons, such as indicative votes or the Cooper Bill 2019, could be seen as MPs as 
outsiders trying to become insiders. In the health domain, even the Secretary of State 
for Health was an outsider to Brexit negotiations under the May and Johnson 
governments, as he was not one of the ministers around the table when decisions on 
the UK position were taken. Further, our MP interviewees expressed concern over the 
perceived inability of MPs to hold government to account in even the most 
rudimentary ways, such as by securing transparent access to relevant information 
(Health and Social Care Committee 2017, 2018a, 2018b). Interviewees saw this as an 
example of how far removed from the ordinary political realm the Brexit process had 
become.   
 
To summarise: the way in which questions of how to leave the EU were resolved as 
time unfolded resulted in othering increasingly significant groups within the UK, 
even though those groups were insiders in the original referendum decision. 
 
But of course, the effects of the decision whether to leave the EU, as well as how to do 
so, ripple far beyond the UK, EU nationals resident in the UK, and UK nationals who 
have been resident in the EU for over 15 years. 
 
UK-based companies, which supply products across the EU, need to shift regulatory 
interactions to other Member States, so as to secure continued access to the EUs 
internal market. Medicines and devices regulation is a case in point, where the UK 
was/is a highly reputable place to undergo regulatory oversight, securing certainty for 
industry operators as well as patient safety.  CE certificates need to be migrated to 
BSIs Dutch entity, or to another EU-established notified body.  99% of centrally 
authorized medicines had been brought into regulatory conformity by 12 April 2019 
(European Commission 2019b), and a relocated European Medicines Agency 
completed this work, alongside ongoing work on UK-nationally authorized medicines.  
The costs of relocation of the EMA include the physical costs of moving, but also the 
delays caused to the EMAs work.  
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National administrative capacity had to be expanded, for example in the Dutch and 
French ports, and in airports.  Pharmaceuticals batch-testing facilities needed to be 
transferred from the UK to the EU.  Companies such as AstraZeneca, and 
organizations like the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations, warned of the complexities of securing supply of medicines, especially to 
countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium.  Even though supply was secured 
(Guarascio 2019), there are obviously cost implications. Legal changes were also 
necessary, for example Spains No-Deal legislation, which included an attempt to 
secure health care access for UK pensioners in southern Spain.  All of these activities 
involved negative implications not least in the form of lost opportunities for the public 
and private expenditure which could otherwise be used for other purposes.   
 
Even if Council-27s negotiating position might have been said to be representing 
interests of firms and people in the EU27 at a broad brush level, that cannot account 
for the more granular decisions being taken at both EU and national levels.  And those 
types of decisions have significant effects, inter alia in the health policy domain.  
 
To summarise, a health Brexternality has the following features: the effects of leaving 
the EU impose costs on the health of others who were unable to be involved in the 
decision to leave the EU, and/or in decisions about the manner in which the UK left 
the EU. Brexternalities thus involve questions about policy legitimacy and 
accountability of post-Brexit health governance. Health Brexternalities are not, 
however, evenly felt: their impact is differential on the basis of spatially-determined 
modalities.   
 
Spatially differentiated health Brexternalities 
 
Where health services or products provision is particularly closely tied to the UK, 
health Brexternalities are most severe. The prime example of this is in the Republic 
of Ireland, which is the EU state with the closest historical, political and economic ties 
with the UK. It is discussed below. But other examples also emerged from our 
research: both from the desk-based analysis and especially from the interviews. These 
involve countries like Spain, with a high concentration of UK nationals receiving 
health care, due to the climate; Malta, which has been closely integrated with the UK 
in terms of medicines supply, and regulatory capacity building; and Central and 
Eastern Europe, where the UK was seen as the ideal place to train as a medical 
professional.  
 
Southern Europe (Spain) 
 
In certain areas of Spain and other parts of southern Europe, significant communities 
of UK nationals have chosen to reside post-retirement.  Estimates suggest around 190 
000 UK pensioners are in this situation (House of Lords, 2018), although official 
figures probably hide significantly more people who in effect live between the UK and, 
say, Spain, spending some of each year in either place (Benson, 2018; Menon 2018).  
Sometimes, this is on medical advice: the warmer climate suits certain chronic 
conditions. These people relied on EU law rights to access health care.  Removing those 
entitlements, unless replaced with something else, would mean they would need to 
have private health insurance, a significant cost and burden, especially for those with 
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chronic or multiple conditions for whom insurance might be unaffordable or simply 
not available (McKee and McKee 2018) 
 
Under the Withdrawal Agreement (WA), Article 32, entitlements to access medical 
care will continue as long as UK nationals in EU countries continue to be in a cross-
border situation after 31 December 2020. The European Commissions view is that 
Article 32 WA also extends entitlements to access medical care relying on EHIC to EU 
nationals resident in the UK, on visits to the EU.  This is one of the aspects of the 
Withdrawal Agreement in which rights and obligations continue past the Agreements 
transition period.  According to Articles 126 and 132 WA, this period ends on 31 
December 2020, unless the WAs Joint Committee (an institution comprising 
representatives of the EU and UK, which supervises implementation of the WA, see 
Article 164 WA) agrees otherwise before 1 July 2020.  Brexternalities are significantly 
reduced with this type of Brexit (Armstrong 2019b), although the cross-border 
situation would be disrupted, and hence rights lost, if a UK patient returned to the UK 
and then sought to go back to Spain, or if an EU national left the UK in such a way as 
to lose the ordinary residence that entitles access to the NHS (and hence 
responsibility of the UKs NHS for necessary health care on a visit to an EU country).  
 
Some UK nationals in EU countries could rely on EU law covering third country 
nationals, which grants some rights, including potentially to health care, to those 
resident for more than 5 years (Long Term Residents Directive 2003/109/EC). The 
Long Term Residents Directive, Article 11 (1) requires Member States to treat those 
within its scope on an equal basis as nationals in terms of, inter alia, access to services 
available to the public, and to social protection and social assistance.  However, 
Member States may restrict this entitlement to core benefits only (Article 11 (4). The 
CJEU has defined such core benefits in a housing case (Kamberaj, see also European 
Commission 2019a), as those which enable individuals to meet their basic needs, such 
as food, accommodation and health. But the scope of this provision is untested in the 
context of healthcare. 
 
In addition to the Withdrawal Agreement, effects of Brexit on health outside the UK 
need to take into account domestic law responses. Spain, along with several other EU 
countries, took steps to reduce the negative effects of a No-Deal Brexit on resident UK 
nationals.  Its Royal Decree-Law 5/2019, 1 March 2019, sought to grant UK nationals 
in Spain the same rights that they previously enjoyed, including access to healthcare 
(Articles 2 and 13).  On its face, this approach would significantly reduce health 
Brexternalities. But there are a number of potential problems. 
 
First, these legal measures are subject to the principle of reciprocity. In other words, 
for UK nationals to continue to enjoy rights in Spain, Spanish nationals in the UK 
would need to be given the same rights that they previously enjoyed. The text of 
Decree-Law 5/2019 provides that the UK has to guarantee rights on the same terms 
and subject to the same conditions as pre-Brexit. It is not clear whether the terms and 
conditions concern only the substantive content of the rights at issue (access to 
healthcare as if a UK national), or whether they are also to do with the enforceability 
and/or the legal source of the right.  Interpreted literally, the terms and conditions of 
the current position include the qualities of EU law, such as its enforceability before 
national courts, its primacy over conflicting domestic law, and the ability to refer 
questions to the CJEU on authoritative interpretations of relevant rights.  These are 
all guaranteed by the Withdrawal Agreement.  However, looking at the substance of 
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the relevant rights, the terms on which Spanish nationals will access the NHS post-
Brexit are under the new settled status regime, which involves some small substantive 
differences (mainly concerning family members) to EU citizenship entitlements, but 
crucially significant procedural differences. And, if the UK were to move post-2020 to 
impose any new administrative constraints on access to the NHS for Spanish nationals 
in the UK, either visitors or people there longer term, that were not in place before, 
that would jeopardise the condition of reciprocity in the Spanish law.  
 
Second, the Spanish law only involves an undertaking to treat persons entitled to 
healthcare in the UK or Gibraltar by the relevant British entities. Entitlement to non-
emergency secondary-care medical treatment in the UK is on the basis of ordinary 
residence, not citizenship. So someone who is not ordinarily resident in the UK 
(because they are resident in Spain) would not be covered by this Decree-Law. So there 
is a potential gap in protection for those who have not been resident in Spain long 
enough to fall under the EUs Long Term Residents Directive, but have been resident 
in Spain too long to be ordinarily resident in the UK for the purposes of accessing 
healthcare.  
 
Third, on a practical level, the UK also has to reimburse the Spanish authorities for the 
health care undertaken. This is covered by the Withdrawal Agreement, Article 34. The 
costs of putting this new reimbursement system in place are among the health 
Brexternalities at issue. 
 
Small states with close UK health ties (Malta) 
 
Historic ties in the health domain between the UK and small states, especially English-
speaking states, like Malta, affect the way health Brexternalities will be felt in 
different parts of the EU.  Small states often have close economic ties with large states 
with whom they have historic or colonial legacies, working closely in similar regulatory 
frameworks and traditions (Corbett and Veenendaal, 2018).  Maltas health care 
system worked with the UKs Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA), which authorizes pharmaceuticals for market access, even before Maltese 
accession to the EU. Many medical professionals, particularly specialists, practising in 
Malta, qualified in the UK.  The MHRA trained the Maltese health inspectorate.   
 
Some 60-70% of medicines used in Malta come through the UK, supplied by UK-based 
agents. Maltese doctors are accustomed to prescribing them and patients to using 
them. Security of medicines supply is therefore a huge potential Brexternality for a 
country like Malta (Musazzi et al 2020). The Maltese authorities sought to mitigate 
these problems by working with stakeholders to stockpile and to convince them to 
secure different supply chains, from other EU Member States, or at least from a 
supplier which holds a marketing authorization in another EU Member State.  
 
This is far from easy, because medicines need to be labeled and product information 
leaflets supplied in one of Maltas official languages. The market in Malta is too small 
(450 000 patients) to justify relabeling in Maltese, and English is an official language, 
hence the current practice of using packaging that is also used in the UK. Multilingual 
labeling is another possible approach, but many EU countries do not accept English 
on their pharmaceutical packaging as an additional language. Our interviewees 
suggested that some pharmaceutical companies, particularly the larger ones, were 
reluctant to undertake the costs of securing regulatory compliance, in order to supply 
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the Maltese market.  They expressed concerns that these costs would end up with the 
end-users (patients), and that this burden would fall disproportionately on the older 
population, with chronic conditions. They also suggested that these health 
Brexternalities are largely hidden from the public domain, and that public knowledge 
about these costs of Brexit in Malta is scarce.  
 
States with ties to UK health workforce (Central and Eastern Europe) 
 
The UK labour market and market for services offers a particular draw for EU 
nationals, especially those from Central and Eastern European states, because of its 
relative openness, flexibility and light regulation (Greer in Greer and Laible 2019). 
This is the case in the health care domain as much as in other contexts more associated 
with such labour and service mobility, such as fruit-picking or plumbing. The Standing 
Committee of European Doctors (2017) strongly urged the Barnier negotiating team 
to secure future mutual recognition of UK medical qualifications in the EU. This has 
been achieved in part in the Withdrawal Agreement, for ongoing recognition of 
qualifications that were recognized before the end of December 2020. At the time of 
writing, information on the arrangements under the proposed future EU-UK trade 
relationship suggest they will fall far short of that. 
 
There are particular concerns for medical professional capacity building in Central and 
Eastern European states, where the opportunity to qualify in the English language 
provides a strong incentive for medical professionals to spend part of their career in 
the UK, particularly benefiting from the ability to secure specialist qualifications 
(Kuhlmann et al 2017). Future health workforce planning in those states is thrown into 
jeopardy by these health Brexternalities. The Netherlands, Ireland or Sweden may 
offer alternative opportunities, but none is as large or as open as the UK as a labour 
market (Greer in Greer and Laible 2019). Some of our interviewees suggested that 
Australia or the USA are likely alternative destinations. They also warned that there is 
unlikely to be a benefit to Central or Eastern European states of less outward migration 
of medical professionals: salary levels in those states are insufficient to suggest that 
UK-based medical professionals will return to their home state. 
 
Ireland 
 
It is probably impossible to estimate the risks in general of Brexit to the island of 
Ireland, and we do not attempt to do so here. As de Mars et al (2018) show, the 
particular fragility of the bordering, and de-bordering of Ireland, is profoundly 
affected by the potential re-bordering entailed in Brexit.  Ireland is closely integrated 
with the UK through integrated supply chains; Britain accounts for 30% of Irish 
imports; most analysis shows substantial sector-specific economic losses in Ireland as 
a result of Brexit (Egan in Greer and Laible, 2019; Copenhagen Economics 2018).   
 
Health is only one domain  but an important one  in which the island of Ireland has 
essentially become an integrated entity, albeit an entity which takes a formal form of 
Ireland, and Northern Ireland, as a devolved part of the UK (McHale et al 2020).  Not 
all of the legal and political mechanisms supporting that integration come directly 
from EU membership, which makes it hard to disentangle effects of Brexit on health 
(or anything else) in Ireland.  The Good Friday Agreements power-sharing model is 
based on cooperation and working together (CAWT) in both North-South (Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) and East-West (Republic of Ireland and the UK 
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as a whole) dimensions.  CAWT supports integrated health care systems across the 
island of Ireland, and also with other parts of the UK, such as Scotland, through 
INTERREG funding (Commons Health and Social Care Committee 2017). Health is 
thus one of the successes of the Good Friday Agreement (de Mars et al 2018: 4). 
Pharmaceuticals, devices and consumables supply chains are deeply integrated on the 
island of Ireland, and this is supported by EU law on free movement of products.  The 
health workforce, especially in the geographical north of the island, is essentially 
shared. Some of this is supported by EU law (such as on mutual recognition of 
qualifications). But other aspects are embodied in the Common Travel Area, which 
takes legal form in a set of parallel rules within UK and Irish law (Ryan 2001; 
McGuinness & Gower 2017; de Mars and Murray 2020).  
 
Any division of the island of Ireland through re-bordering, even of the lightest nature, 
involves Brexternalities for health in both Northern Ireland and Ireland. These will 
be felt predominantly in access to medical products such as pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices, as well as provision of health services and the health workforce. The 
UK and Irish governments intend that the Common Travel Area secures continued 
access to emergency, routine and planned publicly funded health services of British 
patients residing in Ireland and Irish citizens residing in the UK (Lidington and 
Coveney MoU 2019), but this is yet to be tested in administrative or judicial contexts. 
 
Although formally Ireland and Northern Ireland have separate health systems, in 
practice the two systems are highly integrated.  One potential health Brexternality, 
recounted in our interviews, is the possible return to a situation in which an ambulance 
can no longer freely cross the border, supported by reciprocal arrangements between 
the two health systems, EU law on free movement of products and mutual recognition 
of qualifications of medical staff (Flear et al 2018; McHale et al 2020).  Thirty years 
ago, critically ill patients had to be transferred between ambulances on the border.  
This involved inefficiencies, as two ambulances and associated staff would be tied up 
in one incident.  For a patient in an acute situation, it could represent the difference 
between life and death.  One of our interviewees described how over 100 patients, 
including a close family member, who would otherwise have died, have been saved by 
these arrangements.  But the arrangements under the Withdrawal Agreement, and in 
particular the Northern Ireland Protocol, secure continued access for ambulances 
across the border on the island of Ireland, removing the potential threat to life itself as 
a particularly poignant health Brexternality. 
 
Significant costs for the Irish health service would have been entailed in dismantling 
the health facilities that are shared across the border, including the North Western 
Cancer Centre at Altnagelvin Hospital in Northern Ireland, which serves patients in 
the western part of Northern Ireland and north and west Donegal; Our Ladys 
Childrens Hospital in Dublin, which provides heart surgery for children across the 
island of Ireland; or the EU-funded 7.6 million project on mental health for Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, supported by the health strand of the CAWT 
(Belfast Telegraph 2018). Shared training, for instance under the EUs INTERREG 
programme involving paramedics in Scotland, the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland, allowed for economies of scale.  To recreate these for Irish patients only could 
be beyond the capacity of the Irish health care system (Health and Social Care 
Committee 2017).  
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And the potential costs go further than mere health care capacity. Health care 
integration has taken place within the broad parameters of the peace process, 
following the Good Friday Agreement. Healthcare thus plays a (small) role in security, 
peace and stability on the island of Ireland (Hervey and Speakman 2018).  The health 
Brexternalities of a post-Brexit border on the island of Ireland thus could extend to 
violence and loss of life, a point noted in some of our interviews. 
 
Around 30 000 workers cross the Irish border daily (NIAC 2018a, paras 5-7 in de Mars 
et al 2018: 76), of whom many work in health and social care (BMA 2018). (For data 
from 2009 on frontier working across the EU generally, which shows health and social 
care is one of the significant industries at issue, see European Commission 2014.)  The 
Common Travel Area (Ryan 2001; de Mars and Murray 2020) effectively secures 
rights to work in this way for British and Irish nationals.  We do not have exact data 
on how many of these workers are EU-26 nationals.  Overall, around 275 ooo non-UK 
EU nationals are resident in Ireland (Central Statistics Office, 2011) and nearly 47 ooo 
in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,  2011). Given 
reliance in the sector generally across the UK, the number is likely to be not 
insignificant. The Withdrawal Agreement reduces the potential Brexternalities here 
significantly during the transition period, where the practices of frontier workers in 
settled patterns of working are secured in legal rights. After December 2020, though, 
the health Brexternalities entailed in introducing more checks on workers and 
increased barriers to working across an EU Member State and a third country will 
make it more difficult to recruit EU-26 nationals to serve the health needs of border 
communities (Connelly 2018: 44, cited in de Mars 2018: 78).   
 
Our interviewees in Ireland expressed concerns that medical professionals working 
across the border would, if forced to choose, elect to relocate to Northern Ireland and 
the UK more generally.  Pay, especially for post-2012 entrants when a 30% austerity 
pay cut was imposed, working conditions and over-crowding in the Irish hospital 
sector do not offer the opportunities that places such as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the UK can offer, so Irish medical graduates emigrate, leaving Ireland 
with unmet healthcare needs.  Further, our interviewees suggested that the post-Brexit 
reduced pool for the UK to recruit to NHS positions, and the departure from the UK of 
EU-26 nationals to other parts of the EU, leaves Ireland vulnerable to attempts by the 
UK to entice Irish medical professionals to the UK, given the shared language and very 
closely aligned qualifications programmes.  The ability of Ireland to persuade UK-
trained Irish national doctors back would be further reduced if the mutual recognition 
of professional qualifications ceased under the future EU-UK relationship. 
 
Ireland shares the vulnerabilities of countries such as Malta when it comes to 
medicines supply. It is a small, English-speaking market, and reliant on UK supply 
chains for pharmaceuticals, medical devices and consumables.  The Withdrawal 
Agreement guarantees free movement of products not only during the transition 
period, but also thereafter. The Northern Ireland Protocol is supposed to move all 
practical administrative aspects involved (customs duties, regulatory controls) to a de 
facto border in the Irish sea, so that there is no land border on the island of Ireland.   
 
The Withdrawal Agreements Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP) in effect assumes that 
Northern Ireland is within the EUs customs territory (NIP Article 6; Weatherill 2020; 
Harvey 2020). More importantly for pharmaceuticals, which are zero-rated in any 
event, but also relevant to medical devices, equipment and consumables, the NIP 
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extends the application of EU goods law (product standards, marketing and product 
safety rules) to Northern Ireland.  EU law on marketing and safety standards for goods 
(all listed at great length in NIP Annex 5) will apply to and in the United Kingdom in 
respect of Northern Ireland (NIP A6(2)).  
 
Although the NIPs stated objective is to be temporary (NIP A1(4)), the amount and 
depth of detail suggests that this has been drafted in a way that it can actually be used.  
And it is not time-bound: it applies until it is superseded by (a) subsequent 
agreement(s) (NIP A1(4)).  The health Brexternalities of a Brexit involving the 
Withdrawal Agreement are thus significantly less than would have been the case under 
a No-Deal Brexit. 
 
But problems remain to be solved, and these will be costly as well as disruptive to 
existing patterns of trade in medicinal products, devices and medical equipment. The 
idea is to move as many checks as possible away from the border, to factories, 
distribution centres and at the end consumer point. But for instance for food safety 
and animal health, key elements of public health protection, the EU will want to be 
satisfied that the UK is upholding the standards agreed in the NIP. This assurance will 
be especially important if the UKs regulatory standards diverge from the EUs 
(Hayward and Phinnemore 2020). In that case, the EU needs to be able to act quickly, 
(De Mars et al 2018: 38-29). All of these changes imply costs, and many will fall 
disproportionately on Ireland.  
 
Although the European Commission acts on behalf of the whole EU, the 
Brexternalities of this position will not be felt evenly across the EU, and will be felt 
much more profoundly in Ireland. 
 
EU population-wide health Brexternalities 
 
The health Brexternalities discussed so far involve spatially differentiated effects.  But 
some health Brexternalities will be felt across the whole EU. These concern in 
particular the significant contributions that the UK has made to the overall EU 
capacity for EU-level regulatory decisions in health domains, as well as UK 
contributions to biomedical research. The size of the UK, its extensive governmental, 
technical/scientific, educational and research resourcing, and its centuries of public 
investment in scientific education and regulatory capacity all make it a significant 
player in the EU (Greer and Loblovà in Greer and Laible 2019).  The UKs 
contributions here fall into two main types: expertise and leadership, with overlaps 
between the two. 
 
Both research and regulatory expertise from the UK have contributed significantly to 
EU decision-making in the health domain (Greer and Loblovà in Greer and Laible 
2019).  The House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee (2018a: para 38) 
found that, in 2016, the UKs Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Authority 
took the lead in nearly half of EU regulatory procedures and on 20-35% of the 
European Medicine Agencys licensing and vigilance work. The UK was extremely 
active in the European Medicines Agencys committees and working parties.  
Replacing that capacity entails costs.  The EMA has brought central marketing 
authorizations involving the UK into regulatory conformity (European Commission 
2019b). However, there are obviously also opportunities here too.  The Netherlands 
embraced the relocation of the EMA to Amsterdam enthusiastically for that reason.  
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Without the inclusion of UK capacity in its delegations, the EUs influence in the 
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, or the International Medical Device 
Regulators Forum is diminished.  More broadly, if the UK drifts towards the USA in 
terms of global standards, e.g. in medicines, or food safety, the EU may find it harder 
to promote its position in global contexts such as the WTO (Jarman, in Greer and 
Laible 2019) 
 
There are also health Brexternalities for the EU in terms of medicines supply. Each 
month, some 45 million boxes of pharmaceutical products go from the UK to the EU 
(and some 37 million from the EU to the UK). This trade is facilitated by marketing 
authorizations recognized by EU law. For access to the EU market, such 
pharmaceuticals marketing authorizations will need to be held by companies in EU 
Member States, and the process of transferring such authorizations entails costs and 
takes time.  Our interviewees expressed some concern that, in the event of a No-Deal 
Brexit, there might have been insufficient time for legal processes to be completed, 
potentially leaving patients across the EU-27 vulnerable to interrupted supply.  But 
delays to Brexit mitigated these time-critical health Brexternalities.  By June 2019, 
some six months before the UK left the EU, the European Commission (2019a) 
reported that 99% of centrally authorized medicines in use in the EU27 had been 
Brexit-proofed.  
 
Removing the UK from the EUs biomedical research capacity also entails significant 
Brexternalities (Cancer Research UK 2020).  It may be that the UK is able to negotiate 
continued access to EU biomedical research funds as a third country.  But this may 
prove politically unappealing, either to the EU, or to the UK, or both.  At the simplest 
level, the EU will lose 12% of its population on Brexit, with implications for the 
potential scale of clinical trials and other biomedical research. Of course, many such 
trials take place using populations drawn from outside the EU, and this will continue. 
But for clinical trials taking place within the EU, the loss of the UK population is likely 
to be particularly starkly felt in the case of rare diseases, where EU-scale research is 
viable because of the scale of the EU population and its ability to invest.   
 
Furthermore, our interviewees estimated that some 60% of products used for clinical 
trials come from the UK, so imposing border controls would necessitate changes to the 
practicalities of EU-wide clinical trials: it will not be possible to continue in the way 
that these trials currently work.  The UK was vastly over-represented in leadership of 
European Reference Networks, which are EU-funded consortia of scientists focusing 
on a particular rare disease.  Our interviewees told us six of the current 24 Networks 
were UK led, and these positions are occupied on the basis of peer review and 
assessment.  By August 2019, all Networks were listed on the relevant website as led 
from other EU Member States (European Commission 2019b).  The EU is losing the 
leadership and research expertise of some of its (and the worlds) best biomedical 
scientists.  One of our interviewees told us that one such Network had extreme 
difficulty finding a non-UK expert to take over its leadership.  All of these losses involve 
health Brexternalities, particularly for sufferers of rare diseases. 
 
Global health Brexternalities 
 
Finally, some health Brexternalities will be felt globally.  The obvious example here is 
communicable disease control.  Greer and Loblovà (2019) contrast the position of 
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EFTA/EEA countries and Switzerland as they relate to the EUs European Centre for 
Disease Control and Surveillance (ECDC).  The difference is striking. For functional 
purposes, where the key granular decisions are made, Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein are in effect treated as EU Member States. Switzerland is not.  This is so 
even though the geography and the dense interconnections between Switzerland and 
the EU suggest that coordination with Switzerland would be desirable.  This is not, 
therefore, a functionally driven matter, and we can expect that the UK will be treated 
similarly once outside the EU.  The Withdrawal Agreement does not include any 
provision about the ECDC.  Indeed, the UK excluded itself from even those collective 
responses to COVID-19 in which it could have participated, for instance joint 
procurement of medicines, vaccines and equipment (McKee et al 2020). 
 
Our interviewees were universally concerned about UK exclusion from the ECDC.  
They point to Public Health Englands huge contribution to ECDCs work, noting that 
nobody has as good scientific input as the UK, that the UK punches way above its 
weight (McHale et al 2018), and the UKs leadership on all kinds of communicable 
and non-communicable disease surveillance and research.  Even the other big EU 
countries do not have that capacity and expertise, and so it is unclear who is going to 
take up the slack post-Brexit.  They note that, unless the UK seeks a Norway-type 
future relationship, it is difficult to see how the UK can be involved in the future.  They 
express some hope that the detriments could be mitigated by working through the 
WHOs International Health Regulations, but note that this will be sub-optimal.  One 
interviewee distinguishes between high level and global threats, where it will remain 
possible to work with the UK through the WHO mechanisms, and the daily things, 
threats that are more specific to the EU, which are discussed in the EU context through 
ECDC, for example an outbreak of Hepatitis A in men who have sex with men, 
involving the UK and a few other countries.  These will not be possible to carry out 
using UK capacity post-Brexit, and that will be to the detriment of the EU, and the rest 
of the world, in terms of communicable disease data gathering, surveillance and 
response.  Another interviewee notes that not easily being able to share data through 
the ECDCs early warning system on what is happening in the UK will be detrimental 
to public health across the EU. This is also a concern for the food, medicines and 
chemicals agencies and others with early warning mechanisms. The IHR mechanisms 
do not in themselves cover this kind of information-sharing.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
The EU is a particularly effective (though of course far from perfect) institutional and 
legal arrangement for managing political and economic externalities. Other 
mechanisms or relationships between the UK and the EU are likely to be sub-optimal 
in that regard at least in the short to medium term. 
 
Different levels and types of integration of health law and policy mean Brexternalities 
are felt differently in different contexts in the health law and policy domain. Although 
some are felt by certain groups in the UK, such as rare disease sufferers who were 
excluded from the referendum vote, health Brexternalities fall mainly in EU 
countries.  
 
But health Brexternalities do not fall equally in all EU countries. They are felt more 
distinctly in the context of those elements of health policy that are most closely 
entwined with the UKs health policy: for instance, on the island of Ireland; certain 
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areas of Spain and other parts of southern Europe; small English speaking countries 
who rely on the UK for medicines supply; under-capacitated countries, for instance, in 
Central and Eastern Europe who rely on the UK for medical professional training. 
Some health Brexternalities, such as in medicines safety, are imposed on the whole 
population of the EU. And some health Brexternalities, such as in communicable 
disease control, will be felt globally. 
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